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Article 3

CONFRONTATION BY WITNESSES IN
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE SECURITY PROCEEDINGS
Jan Z. Krasnowiecki*
A recent report of the Commission on Government Security
has again touched upon the troublesome question of confrontation. This question was raised in the briefs of petitioner and
amicus curiae in Peters v. Hobby,' but left undecided in that
case. On the whole, the Commission's findings are not favorable
to the view that confrontation by witnesses in Government
is a right to which there should be no exsecurity proceedings
2
ceptions.
The Commission's special study on confrontation suggests the
presence of certain assumptions which it is my purpose here to
discuss. First, there is the statement that the existing provisions
for a hearing in security cases are a "departure from what may
be regarded as the normal procedures."3 The assumption which
this statement suggests is that the Constitution does not require
hearings in such cases for, unless this language is being used in
some special sense, a procedure which is required by the Con* Member of the Illinois Bar. B.A., M.A., B.C.L. (Oxon.); L.L.M., Harvard,
1956.
1 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
2 COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY, REPORT 66-68, 657-64 (1957).
3 Id. at 660.

(180)
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stitution would seem to be normal. Second, there is the statement that to claim a constitutional right to confrontation in
security cases is "to confuse an administrative hearing in an
essentially employer-employee relationship with a criminal prosecution."4 The tone of finality which is given to this statement
suggests the assumption that the Constitution speaks to confrontation only through the sixth amendment.
It can be seen that these assumptions make it a good deal
easier to find, as the Commission did find, that confrontation by
witnesses in government security proceedings, if given in all
cases, would compromise the national security. 5 The role which
these assumptions may have played in the Commission's findings
gains importance in the light of the restrictions placed upon its
access to relevant information. Public Law 304, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1955), which established the Commission, provided:
Section 8. Nothing contained in this joint resolution shall be
construed to require any agency of the United States to release

any information possessed by it when, in the opinion of the
President, the disclosure of such information would jeopardize
or interfere with a pending or prospective criminal prosecution,
or with the carrying out of the intelligence or investigative responsibilities of such agency, or would jeopardize or interfere
with the interests of national security.

At present, civilian employees of the federal government are
subject to three programs touching security: (1) the program
applicable to civilian employees in the executive branch, established by Executive Order 104500 under Public Law 733, 7 which
is a continuation and extension of earlier programs undertaken
by the Government under the Lloyd-LaFollette and Veteran's
Preference Acts; s (2) the Atomic Energy Commission's program covering employees of the Commission as well as certain
non-government employees9 (the employees of the Commission
are also subject to Executive Order 10450); (3) the Civil
Service Commission's regulations applicable to the classified
personnel of the civil service. 10
4

Id. at 662.

5
6
7

Id. at 668.
18 Fan. REG. 2489 (1953).

64 STAT. 476, 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 (1950).
8 Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 37 STAT. 555 (1912), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 652
(1926); Veterans' Preference Act, 58 STAT. 390 (1944), as amended, 5 U.S.C.
§863 (1947); Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 FEn. REa. 1935 (1947); Exec. Order No.
10241, 16 FaD. REG. 3690 (1951).
9 10 C.F.R. §§ 4.1-4.35 (Supp. 1956); 68 STAT. 942 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2165
(Supp. IV, 1957).
10 5 C.F.R. §§ 06.2, 06.4, 2.106, 9.101-9.108, 22.101-22.603 (Supp. 1956). The
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These programs are discussed in detail elsewhere."i In this
paper my purpose is simply to consider whether, under any of
the applicable security programs, there is a constitutional basis
for a claim by a government employee to a hearing and to confrontation by witnesses as a part of such hearing when the result
of the hearing will be to publicly label him as a security risk.
Thus the questions posed are: I. Is there anything in the
United States Constitution which requires that a hearing be given to a government employee who is discharged for the publicly
stated reason that he is a security risk? II. Assuming that a hearing of some kind is required under the Constitution, is confrontation by witnesses part of that requirement?
I
It should be noted that the basic security program which the
Government undertook under the Lloyd-LaFollette and Veterans' Preference Acts made provisions for some kind of a hearing. Likewise, the Government's present program under Public
Law 733, so far as it continues operative after the decision in
Cole v. Young, 1 2 makes provision for some kind of a hearing.
But while Public Law 733 specifically provides that at the employee's request a hearing shall be given to "any employee having a permanent or indefinite appointment, and having completed his probationary or trial period, who is a citizen of the
United States . . ." the Veterans' Preference Act does not contain any such provision; the Lloyd-LaFollette Act provides, on
the contrary, that:
No examination of witnesses nor any trial or hearing shall be
required except in the discretion of the officer or employee
directing the removal or suspension without pay. 13

It can be seen, therefore, that my first question involves the
constitutionality of this paragraph of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act
in respect of the words "or hearing." The importance of my
first question in its relation to the government employee security
programs lies not only in the fact that it is logically antecedent
last of these deals with appeals of preference eligibles under the Veterans* Preference
Act. But see 64 STAT. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 (1952): "[The] determination
by the agency head concerned shall be conclusive and final . . ." See also Cole v.
Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
11
COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY, REPORT 24-35 (1957); ASSOCIATION
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL
LoYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM, REPORT C. 4 (1956).
12
13

351 U.S. 536 (1956).
37 STAT. 555 (1912), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 652 (a) (1952).
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to any question in regard to confrontation at such hearings as are
given under the programs, but also in the fact that certain decisions denying a constitutional claim to confrontation are based
on the assumption, repeated by the Commission on Government
Security, that no hearing of any kind need be given in the first
place.
This assumption undoubtedly played an important role in
Bailey v. Richardson,'4 which shall be discussed fully later. Of
the cases cited in support of the assumption, there is not one
which squarely holds that no hearing of any kind need be given
to a government employee who is discharged for a specified
cause as against his constitutional objections that he must have a
hearing. Not one of the cases involved a situation where the
employee was both (a) discharged for a stated serious cause,
and (b) given no opportunity whatever to refute the charges
levelled against him. Indeed, while the Lloyd-LaFollette Act
provides that a hearing is discretionary with the removing officer,
it also provides, at the same time, that the employee "shall (1)
have notice of the . . .charges preferred against him; (2) be
furnished with a copy of such charges; (3) be allowed a reasonable time for filing a written answer to such charges, with affidavits; and (4) be furnished at the earliest practicable date with
a written decision on such answer."' 15 All the cases involve situations in which the employee has been given opportunity to answer the charges brought against him in writing supported by
affidavits.16
The case holding most squarely that the employee is not entitled to a hearing over and above such written answer is Culligan
v. United States. 7 But in that case there is no suggestion that
the employee's claim for a hearing involved any constitutional
14 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), ali'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S.
918 (1951).
15 37 STAT. 555 (1912), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 652 (a) (1952).
16 Levine v. Farley, 107 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 622
(1939); Gadsden v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 487, 78 F. Supp. 126 (1948);
Culligan v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 222, cert. denied, 330 U.S. 848 (1946);
Golding v. United States, 78 Ct. C1. 682, cert. denied, 292 U.S. 643 (1934); Kellom
v. United States, 55 Ct. CI. 174 (1920); Eberlein v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 466,
aff'd, 257 U.S. 82 (1918). In Maghan v. Board of Comm'rs. of Dist. of Columbia,
144 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1914), no hearing whatever was given; however, (a)
Maghan was not removed but only transferred, and (b) no cause was stated for
transfer. In Page v. Moffett, 85 Fed. 38 (C.C.NJ. 1898), again no opportunity to
defend was given but again no cause was stated for dismissal. In Weinstein v.
United States, 109 Ct. Cl. 579, 74 F. Supp. 554 (1947), there was no hearing because
Weinstein failed to avail herself of her right to one.
17 107 Ct. Cl. 222, cert. denied, 330 U.S. 848 (1947).
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attack on the Lloyd-LaFollette Act under which he was dismissed. All of the cases involve attempts by employees to obtain
a review of the fact determination made by the removing officer,
and allegations that the opportunity to answer in writing supported by affidavits is insufficient are made, not on constitutional
grounds, but in order to indicate the weakness of the fact determination attacked.
There is no clear agreement between the litigants and the
courts as to what is meant by a hearing. Thus in Eberlein v.
United States'8 the court said: "There can be no question from
the findings in this case that the plaintiff had the benefit of a
hearing according to the regulations then in force . . . . It is
settled that in such cases the action of the executive officers is
not subject to revision in the courts." If the report of the case
below is consulted'" it will be seen that Eberlein did not in fact
receive a hearing other than through a written answer supported
by affidavits. While I have not been able to find any case which
squarely holds that a government employee may be dismissed
for a stated serious cause without a hearing, as against his constitutional objections that he must have a hearing, there are
three cases which together suggest that he may not be so dismissed: Shurtleff v. United States, 0 Slochower v. Board of Education,2 and Jay v. Boyd.2 2
In the Shurtleff case, the President dismissed a general appraiser of merchandise by a letter which read: "Sir: You are
hereby removed from the office of general appraiser of merchandise, to take effect upon the appointment and qualification of
your successor. '22 The act of June 19, 1890, authorizing the
President to appoint general appraisers of merchandise provided
that they could be removed by him ". .. for inefficiency, neglect
of duty, or malfeasance in office... . The Court recognized that
"where an officer may be removed for certain causes, he is entitled to a notice and hearing. '2 4 But the Court held that the
power to appoint includes the power to remove at will unless the
act of June 10, 1890, provided to the contrary. The Court held
that Congress could not have intended, by specifying the causes
is
19

257 U.S. 82, 84 (1921).
53 Ct. CI. 466 (1918).
20 189 U.S. 311 (1902).
21 350 U.S. 551 (1955).
22 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
23 189 U.S. at 312.
24

Id. at 314.
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for removal, to detract from the general power of the President
to remove at will, as established by earlier cases. The right to a
hearing where a removal is for cause, recognized in Shurtleff, is

not of recent origin. In Bagg's Case, 1615,25 one of twelve city
burgesses was removed for disrespect to the mayor, without a
hearing. The court granted mandamus to compel his reinstatement and Coke tells us:
[I]t was resolved, that no freeman of any corporation
can be disfranchised by the corporation, unless they have authority to do it either by the express words of the charter, or by
prescription ....
And although they have lawful authority
either by charter or prescription to remove anyone from the
freedom, and that they have just cause to remove him; yet it
appears by the return, that they have proceeded against him
without hearing him answer to what was objected, or that
he was not reasonably warned, such removal is void, and shall
not bind the party ... and such removal is against justice and

right.

26

Why did the court feel so strongly that such removal is against
justice and right? The court said:
[W]hen a man is a freeman of a city or borough, he has a
freehold in his freedom for his life... and pehaps it concerns
his trade and means of living, and his credit and estimation
27

While the court speaks of a "freehold" it is plain that it is most
concerned with the damage done to a freeman's means of living,
his credit and estimation. Bagg's Case contains a sweeping assertion of jurisdiction:
And in this case, first, it was resolved, that to this Court of
King's Bench belongs authority, not only to correct errors
in judicial proceedings, but other errors and misdemeanors extra-judicial, tending to the breach of peace, or oppression of the
subjects, or to the raising of faction, controversy, debate, or any
manner of misgovernment; so that no wrong or injury, either
public or private, can be done but
it shall be (here) reformed
28
or punished by due course of law.

It has been suggested that "Coke's opinion in Bagg's case may
have been part of his war on the prerogative - its date was
1615 - and to this end he may have been staking a claim by
the common law courts to the jurisdiction of the Star Chamber
or even the Council itself."2 9 But it would be a serious historical
25
26
27
28

11 Co. Rep. 93 (b), 77 Eng. Rep. 1271 (K.B. 1615).
Id. at 99(a).
Id. at 98(b).
Id. at 98(a).

29 Jaffe and Henderson, JudicialReview and the Rule of Law; HistoricalOrigins,
72 L.Q.R. 345, 360 (1956).
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error to say that what the Court of King's Bench then said of the
right to a hearing should be brushed aside because of the scepticism with which its broad claim of jurisdiction was later received
by English lawyers. It is to the time of the struggle against the
prerogrative that we should look for a meaning of the due process clause of our own Constitution. The English revolution
was only half a revolution. In the end, when the struggle was
over, the same absolute power which had been claimed by the
King was conceded to Parliament.3" The appeals to "common
right and reason," to the "fundamental law," to the "law of the
land," were quickly forgotten by Englishmen. 3 They were not
forgotten here. And when Americans undertook to challenge
Parliament itself they used the same arguments that were used
against the prerogative . 2 The other half of the English revolution occurred here. Looking to the period of struggle against
the prerogative, and beyond, we find that the courts of England
enforced the right to a hearing, not only in cases of dismissal by
lay authorities,3 3 but also in cases of dismissal by the Established
Church.3 4 In none of these cases is there any insistence upon the
careful definition of the property right involved, but the determination proceeds upon the view that no one ought to be injured
in his reputation and means of living without a hearing. As the
court said in one case "the laws of God and man both give the
party an opportunity to make his defense, if he has any." 35
In Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.,36
we are told with regard to due process that "we must examine the
constitution itself" and in addition we must look "to those settled
usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common law and
statute laws of England, before the emigration of our ancestors,
30

Lee v. Bude & Torrington Junction Ry., [1871] L.R. 6 C.P. 576.

31

GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAw IN ENGLISH HISTORY (1955).

32 See Otis' arguments against writs of assistance, Quincy 471, 520 (Mass.
1761). Otis relies on Coke in Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 118, 77 Eng. Rep. 638
(K.B. 1610), who spoke of an Act of Parliament as being against "common right
and reason" and so void. Coke may not have meant so broad a claim, but there
cannot be any doubt that common right and reason was to him an integral part of
due process. Cf. GoUGH, op. cit. Supra Ch. III, at 30. See on the American development, MULLET, FUNDAMENTAL

LAW AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

(1933).

33 Rex v. Richardson, I Burr. 517, 97 Eng. Rep. 426 (K.B. 1758); Campion's
Case, 2 Sid. 97, 82 Eng. Rep. 1277 (K.B. 1658); Watkins v. Edwards, 1 Mod. Rep.
286, 86 Eng. Reg. 889 (K.B. 1670); Protector v. Town of Colchester, Sty. 447, 453,
82 Eng. Rep. 850 (K.B. 1655).
43 Regina v. Archbishop of Canterbury, 1 El. & El. 545, 120 Eng. Rep. 1014
(K.B. 1859).
35 Rex v. Chancellor of the University of Cambridge, 1 Str. 557, 93 Eng. Rep.
698, 704 (L.B. 1795) (per Fortescue, J.).
36 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
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and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and
political condition by having been acted on by them after the
settlement in this country.13 7 Coke's view that dismissal for a
stated cause without a hearing is against "justice and right" has
been acted upon by some of the courts of this country. The right
to such hearing is firmly defended as "a fundamental principle of
justice" in Dullam v. Willson"8 and Page v. Hardin;39 yet, some
confusion remains due to the spurious notion that dismissal for
cause is a judicial act and may not be undertaken by the executive.40 But this confusion is well resolved by some dictum in
Biggs v. McBride41 where it is said that whether dismissal for
cause is a judicial act or not there must be a hearing.
It is true that, on the facts of these cases and of the early
English cases referred to, it might be argued that the recognition
of a right to a hearing in them and in Shurtleff v. United States
is confined to dismissals for stated cause where the power exercised is one to dismiss for cause only. But it seems that if it is
against "justice and right" for the government to dismiss, without
a hearing, under some stated charge, in the exercise of a power
to dismiss for cause only, it must likewise be against "justice and
right" to dismiss, without a hearing, under a stated grave charge,
in the exercise of a power to dismiss at will. In any case, a
restrictive interpretation of the cases discussed advances very
little the cause of those who maintain that a hearing in government security proceedings is a matter of grace and not of right.
Anyone can observe that where the Government has power
to dismiss at will it will be glad to do so. The trouble in the
security proceedings has arisen in cases where the Government
did not, or thought it did not, have the power to dismiss at will.
The restrictive interpretation of the early English cases and the
American cases concerning the right to a hearing, affects only
those security cases where the Government has mistakenly
stated the reason for dismissal when there was no need for it to
4
do so. That was probably the situation in Bailey v. Richardson. 1
The court there did not put a restrictive interpretation on the
59 U.S. at 276-17.
53 Mich. 392, 407, 19 N.W. 112, 119 (1884).
39 47 Ky. Rep. (8 B. Mon.) 648, 672 (1848).
40 Police Comm'rs of Jersey City v. Pritchard, 36 NJ.L. 101 (1873), criticized
in Attorney Gen. v. Hawkins, 44 Ohio St. 98, 5 N.E. 228 (1886).
41
17 Ore. Rep. 640, 651, 21 Pac. 878, 881 (1889) (dictum).
42 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cik. 1950), a0'd by an equaly divided Court, 341 U.S.
918 (1951).
37

38
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cases I have discussed, but in fact ignored them completely.
The court bolstered its opinion that no hearing and no confrontation by witnesses need be given by reference to the provision of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, the constitutionality of
which it is my purpose here to challenge, namely, the provision
that "No examination of witnesses nor any trial or hearing shall
be required except in the discretion of the officer or employee
directing the removal or suspension without pay. '43 The LloydLaFollette Act provides that dismissal of employees in the
"classified civil service," as therein defined, shall be only "for
such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Thus,
even on a restrictive interpretation of the cases I have discussed,
there appears to be grave doubt that this section of the act is
constitutional.
Jay v. Boyd
Jay v.
involved a resident alien who had been ordered
deported after a hearing "the fairness of which [was] unchalBoyd44

lenged." 4 5 He applied to the Attorney General for discretionary

suspension of deportation under section 244 (a) (5) and 244
(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.46 This
application was denied on the basis of "confidential information"
the nature of which was not disclosed to Jay. Jay's position was
that the statute providing for discretionary suspension of deportation itself required that a hearing be given to him and that
such hearing, to be fair, must involve a full disclosure of the
confidential information relied upon. Alternatively, his position
was that if the statute does not expressly grant a right to a hearing, such right should be implied to accord with the "tradition
and principles of free government." The majority of the Court
held that "there is no express statutory grant of any right to a
hearing on application to the Attorney General for discretionary
suspension of deportation."4 They did not see, in petitioner's
alternative position, any constitutional attack upon the statute.
The matter is disposed of in footnote 21 to the majority opinion:
It is not claimed that a contrary construction [contrary to that
urged by petitioner] would render the statute . . . unconstitutional, or even that a substantial constitutional question would
43

44

37 STAT. 555 (1912), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 652 (a) (1952).
351 U.S. 345 (1956).

45 Id. at 348.
46 66 STAT. 214, 215-216, 8 U.S.C. 1254 (a) (5) (c) (1952).
47 351 U.S. at 351.
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thereby arise.... Moreover, the constitutionality of § 244 as
herein interpreted gives us no difficulty. Cf. Williams v. New
York ....
48

The Court then went on to "adopt the plain meaning of [the]
statute, however severe the consequences," brushing aside
petitioner's claim that a right to a hearing should be implied,
with the words "suspension of deportation is not given to deportable aliens as a right, but, by congressional direction, it is
dispensed according to the unfettered discretion of the Attorney
'49
General.
The majority's view on the constitutional question, if any,
presented in this case, though only contained in a footnote and
confined to a short sentence, is very instructive for our purposes
especially in view of the Court's citation to Williams v. New
York.5" In that case the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
section of the New York Criminal Code authorizing the sentencing judge to use information obtained out of court and from
witnesses who had not been subject to cross examination by
defendant in his determination of the proper sentence. The
Court held that once the defendant's guilt is established by
competent evidence in open court, a sentencing judge should
not be denied access to information which would aid him in
the exercise of this discretionary function.
We can concede for present purposes that, absent statute,
the Government has the same unfettered discretion to remove
its employees as do private employers. Therefore, the argument
at this point is that a government employee, with tenure, cannot
complain of the procedures Congress authorizes for his dismissal
as a security risk because Congress could withdraw the protection of the tenure laws altogether and open the employee to
the possibility of dismissal without any procedures at all."' To
paraphrase this argument in terms of private employment, a
private employee, with tenure, can be fired by his employer for
the publicly stated reason that he embezzled some funds, and
such employee has no right to litigate the truth of this reason
because the employer could have hired him without tenure, and
could have fired him without reason. Apart from its logical
absurdity, the argument is belied by the law of defamation.
48 Id. at 357.
49 Id. at 357-58.
50 337 U.S. 241 (1948).
51 Apparently, this was the argument applied by the court in Coleman v. Brucker,
26 U.S.L. W=an 2241 (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 1957).
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The United States is immune from action for defamation, 52
and most of its servants can claim an absolute or a qualified privilege in this respect. But the defense of privilege is available here
not because government servants have a right to say what they
will of others, but because it is in the public interest that those
charged with the duty to speak should speak.5 3
If there is a wide discretion here, it is a discretion which is
born of legal defenses available to government servants to protect
them in their duty to inform the public on matters which concern the public. This discretion is not of the sort which, on the
reasoning of Jay v. Boyd and Williams v. New York, could
lead us to say that the victim of the information has no right to
a hearing.
Slochower v. Board of Education
In Slochower v. Board of Education5 4 the Court struck down
a provision of the charter of the City of New York which provided for the automatic termination of the employment of any
city employee who invoked the privilege against self-incrimination to avoid answering a question relating to his official conduct. The Court noted that "In practical effect the questions
asked are taken as confessed and made the basis of the discharge." It went on to state that "No consideration is given to
such factors as the subject matter of the questions, remoteness of
the period to which they are directed, or justification for exercise
of the privilege ....-5r The important portion of the opinion, for

our purposes, is:
This is not to say that Slochower has a constitutional right to
be an associate professor of German at Brooklyn College. The
State had broad powers in the selection of its employees, and it
may be that proper inquiry would show Slochower's continued
employment to be inconsistent with a real interest of the State.
But there has been no such inquiry here. We hold that summary
dismissal of appellant violates due process of law. 56

52 28 u.s.c. 2680(h) (1952).
53 Sauber v. Gliedman, Civil No. 57C450, N.D. Ill., Sept. 24, 1957; Barr v.
Matteo, 244 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Colpoys v. Gates, 118 F.2d 16 (D.C.
Cir. 1941); Glass v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940), Mellor v. Brewer, 18
F.2d. 168 (D.C. Cir. 1927); see HART & WECHSLER, FEDEAL CouRTs AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEm 1215-24 (1953), discussing Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d
Cir. 1949).
54 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
55

Id. at 558.

56 Id. at 559.
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The Court's opinion may mean either or both of the following:
(1) since the inference of guilt from the invocation of the privilege is not permissible, a statute which provides for termination
of employment upon the invocation is arbitrary unless it also
provides for a hearing to determine the existence of the fact
inferred and its relation to the duties of employment; and (2) a
statute might be couched in such terms as to make discharge
upon the mere inference of guilt from the invocation of the privilege a ground for dismissal, provided there is a much closer
relation between the fact inferred and the duties of employment.
But if the Court meant, or would agree to, the second proposition, would it say that dismissal may proceed without a
hearing? The second proposition would, I take it, be satisfied by
a statute which provides that any teacher employed in the public
schools who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination
when asked whether he had ever committed indecent assault
upon a minor, would be discharged automatically. If that statue
would pass the test on arbitrary classification, which appears to
be the core of the Slochower case, should there be no right to a
hearing?
The answer may be "No" if the statute, or the discharging
letter, states that the reason for the discharge is not the teacher's
assumed guilt but the loss of his effectiveness as a teacher due to
the inference which the public in fact draws from his invocation
of the privilege. Here it would seem that the discharge can proceed though there is no hearing on the issue of guilt. But that is
only because that issue is irrelevant to the grounds for dismissal.
On the other hand, if the statute, or the discharging letter,
admits of the construction that the reason for discharge is the
inference of guilt, there must be a right to a hearing on this
issue. For a government agency to foreclose the matter without
a hearing would be to give an official stamp of approval to an
inference of guilt and so to contribute materially to the destruction of the discharged teacher's means of living. It seems to me
that the Slochower opinion comes close to recognizing that a
person may have no right to continued employment and yet have
a right to be protected against arbitrary action where his continued means of living are threatened in the mode of his discharge.
There is nothing in the "loyalty oath cases" which would
impair this conclusion. It is clear that in Garner v. Los Angeles
Board, the employees had been afforded a hearing. 5 7 The ques57

341 U.S. 716, 719 (1950).
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tion of a right to a hearing, therefore, was not involved in that
case. Nor was it at issue in Wieman v. Updegraff. 58 The position
of the employees in each case was not that the inference from
their refusal to take the oath was unjustified, but rather
that the class of persons affected by the inference contained
individuals whose loyalty attributes differ so widely that a classification of such individuals together for purposes of discharge
was arbitrary.
Thus the principle which evolved from those cases is that the
"loyalty oath" is invalid if it is construed as affecting adversely
employees who during their affiliation with a proscribed organization were innocent of its purpose, or employees who severed
their relations with any such organization when its character
became clear. My contention that there must be a right to a hearing where the employee contests the truth of the fact inferred
itself, is not disposed of sub silentio, in those cases. It is not
disposed of either by saying that after all, if given a hearing, the
employee will only continue to refuse to answer the critical
question, or to take the oath, as before.
The value of the right to make a record of the reasons why
one refuses to answer certain questions was plainly demonstrated
in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California.59 In that case the Court
held Konigsberg, an applicant for admission to the California
bar, had so clearly discharged his burden of proving that he was
of good moral character, that a decision on this point against
him, merely because of his continued refusal to answer questions
directed to his communist party membership, was contrary to
due process.
While, in this part of the paper, I am primarily concerned
with showing that an employee may not be discharged for a
publicly stated cause without his being afforded a hearing as to
the existence of such cause, cases such as Slochower, in which
the existence of the cause for discharge is inferred from a refusal
to answer certain questions, raise another problem which merits
careful consideration.
As we have seen in the Slochower case the Court openly condemned the practice of imputing a sinister meaning to the exercise of a person's constitutional privilege under the fifth amendment.60 It might therefore be argued that even where the em58
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344 U.S. 183 (1952).
353 U.S. 252 (1956).
350 U.S. 551, 557 (1956).
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ployee is given an opportunity to introduce evidence on his behalf in opposition to the inference drawn from his refusal to
answer, and where he fails to avail himself of that opportunity,
or fails to temper the strength of the inference sufficiently to
render a decision against him arbitrary, there remains a constitutional impediment to his discharge - the constitutional impediment that no sinister meaning can be attributed to his
silence.
This question came before the New York Court of Appeals in
Lerner v. Casey.6 ' Max Lerner, a subway conductor employed
by the New York Transit Authority, was discharged under the
provisions of the New York Security Risk Law, 62 for in the
words of the statute, "reasonable grounds exist for the belief
that, because of [his] doubtful trust and reliability... [his continued employment] would endanger the security or defense of
the nation and the state." The sole fact relied on by the security
agency for this ground of discharge was that Lerner had refused
to answer whether he was then a member of the communist party
when the question was put to him by the Commissioner of Investigation of the City of New York during the investigation of
security in the transit system.
The case involved questions as to the validity and applicability
of the Security Risk Law and as to the Commissioner's power to
conduct the investigation. All of these questions were decided
against Lerner. Lerner's remaining contentions are of importance. Consistently with the provisions of the Security Risk Law,
Lerner was given the opportunity to submit statements or affidavits to demonstrate why he should be reinstated. He did not
avail himself of this opportunity. While there is doubt in my
mind whether this opportunity would satisfy what I have been
concerned with showing was Lerner's right to a hearing, Lerner
clearly had no intention of asserting that right, and I have no
doubt that he waived whatever argument he had on this ground.
However, it remained open to Lerner to argue, as he did argue,
that before the security risk agency could find him to be a
security risk, the agency must not only give him a hearing, but
must give him one at which the evidence against him is introduced, and that the agency could not discharge him for the
mere failure to answer the question as to his communist party

61
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2 N.Y.2d 355, 141 N.E.2d 533 (1957).
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 1101-08 (McKinney 1949).
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membership. In this argument Lerner relied on the Slochower
case. His argument was rejected.
In rejecting Lerner's contentions, the Court of Appeals approved the Appellate Division's interpretation of the Slochower
Case. The Appellate Division was of the opinion that:
[I]n view of the manner in which the court stressed the
'remoteness of the period to which they [the questions] are
directed,' the failure of the statute to provide an opportunity to
explain the reasons for the refusal to answer and, more particularly, the nature of the inquiry being conducted by the Federal

decision must be strictly limited to its own
committee, that
63
peculiar facts.

The court then pointed out that here, "the question asked
was not remote, it was as to petitioner's then membership in
the Communist party.., the petitioner was given an opportunity
' The
to explain why he had chosen not to answer the question."64
court then came to the crux of the case:
Petitioner was not discharged for invoking the Fifth Amendment; he was discharged for creating a doubt as to his trustworthiness and reliability by refusing to answer the question as
to the Communist party membership. 65

And earlier it said: "No inference of membership in that party
was drawn from petitioner's refusal to reply to the question
asked."6 6
I think that it might validly be asked here how the court knew
that "no inference of membership . . . was drawn." I doubt
whether the Commissioner said that he drew no such inference. If
he said so, I doubt whether, allowing for the operation of his
subconscious, his statement can be taken as conclusive. It is
clear that the court thought it knew that no such inference was
drawn as a fact, for the Commissioner was merely required to
find that "reasonable grounds exist," etc. But the Commissioner
also removed Lerner under the "belief that . . . his continued
employment would endanger the security or defense of the nation
and the state." I suggest that the conclusion that no inference of
membership was drawn from Lerner's refusal to answer is in the
same logical category as the conclusion that a fact found in a
civil case is only half as true as a fact found in a criminal case.
The terminus ad quem in a security proceeding is the discharge
of an employee as a security risk. The quantum of proof neces63
64
65

141 N.E.2d at 541.
Id. at 542.
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Ibid.

Ibid.

1958]

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE SECURITY PROCEEDINGS

195

sary to reach it, does not seem to me to dilute its impact on the
public and on the employee's good standing in the community.
I do not think that the court's reasoning here avoids the thrust of
what the Supreme Court said about the invocation of the privilege in Slochower.
The court's next point is much more persuasive. It pointed
out that if it were to accept Lerner's claim that he may not be
dismissed on the mere inference from his refusal to answer, the
result would be that:
An employee may be dismissed for refusing information as to
whether or not he is a Communist party member, Garner v.
Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles [341 U.S. 716]

but if with his refusal he draws into or adds to his words of
refusal a claim that to answer might tend to incriminate him
and he, therefore, claims the privilege to refuse to answer under
the Fifth Amendment 67to the United States Constitution, he

may not be dismissed.
I think the court is right in its conclusion that "That cannot be."
One more case remains to be discussed in this part of the
paper. It may be that in Service v. Dulles6 the Court impliedly
recognized that th& Secretary of State, absent the binding force
of the Department's regulations, could have terminated Service's
employment under the so-called McCarran Rider, without affording him a hearing. This may be, but it does not destroy my
position here. The McCarran Rider provided:
Notwithstanding the provisions of . . . any other law, the
Secretary of State may, in his absolute discretion ... terminate
the employment of any officer or employee of the Department
of State or of the Foreign Service of the United States whenever
he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the
interests of t1he United States .... 69

The Court held that where the Secretary's action was based
upon the Loyalty Review Board's determination that there was
a reasonable doubt as to Service's loyalty, which determination
followed upon a hearing undertaken by that Board of its own
motion, the Secretary's action was affected by the same invalidity
as was that of the Board under the decision in Peters v. Hobby.7 0
In .this decision the Court had held that the Loyalty Review
Board is without jurisdiction to undertake a hearing of its own
motion. In the Service case, the Court held that despite the Secretary's affidavit that his action was not dependent upon the
Ibid.
68 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
69
60 STAT. 458 (1946).
70 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
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Board's determination, he was bound by the Department's regulations which made proceedings before the Board a condition
precedent to the exercise of the discretion vested in the Secretary
under the McCarran Rider.
The point which I desire to make here is that a discharge
under the McCarran Rider, without a hearing, need not be
repugnant to the principle for which I am contending. If the discharge is couched in terms of the Rider, that is, "Your employment is terminated in the interests of the United States," I doubt
that any constitutional objection to a termination without a
hearing would be available." At any rate, it would not have the
same force as in the case of a termination because "Your employment is not clearly consistent with the interests of national
security."
I do not want to establish a formal distinction here; but I do
want to indicate that the right to a hearing for which I am
contending does not tie the Government's hands as an employer
to hire and fire at will. It does, however, prevent the Government from exercising its rights in this respect in such a manner
as to permanently and publicly record a serious charge against
the employee without giving him an opportunity to defend. In
the words of one state court:
[T]he exercise of such power, in such manner, would be too
despotic for any attempt at vindication in a country which
boasts of the utmost liberty compatible with the safety of the
state, and
is entirely opposed to the genius of our free insti72
tutions.

II
clause of the' Constitution 73
process
due
Assuming that the
does require that a government employee be given some type
hearing before being discharged for the publicly stated reason
that he is a security risk, is confrontation by witnesses part of
that requirement?
It should be recognized at the outset that a right to a hearing
is not necessarily a right to a full dress criminal trial. In Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States,74 the Court held that the
statutory right to a hearing under the Tariff Act of 1922, need
71
Compare Becker v. Toulmin, 165 Ohio St. 549, 138 N.E.2d 391 (1956): "We
have found it desirable to terminate employment of our employee, Walter Becker."
Held: Not defamatory of plaintiff.
72 Dullam v. Wilson, 53 Mich. 392, 492 (1884).
73 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
74 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
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not include access to confidential information relied upon by the
Tariff Commission in fixing duties. But Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court said:
If the Commission is under a duty to make disclosure... at
all, the origin of the duty and its measure are to be found, we
think, in this, that since a hearing is required, there is a command by implication to do whatever may be necessary to make
the hearing fair. 75

As was pointed out by Justice Holmes in Mayer v. Peabody,7
"It is familiar that what is due process of law depends on the
circumstances. It varies
with the subject-matter and the neces'77
sities of the situation.
We must pause here because it may be that something like
the thought suggested in Hurtado v. California78 is interfering
with the perspective of the problem at this stage. The question
in that case was whether the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment prohibits a state, the State of California, from providing for indictment by information in capital or infamous
crimes. The Court pointed out that there was nothing in the
common law of England, existing at the time of the immigration
of our ancestors, which would indicate that presentment or indictment of a grand jury is a requirement of due process.
But the Court did not stop at this seemingly sufficient ground
for holding the California provision valid; instead, it went on to
apply a canon of statutory interpretation which has done a considerable disservice to clear thinking in this field. First, the
Court said, with justice, that the words "due process of law" in
the fourteenth amendment79 must have the same meaning as do
the same words in the fifth amendment. It then said:
According to a recognized canon of interpretation, especially
applicable to formal and solemn instruments of constitutional
law, we are forbidden to assume, without clear reason to the

contrary, that any part of this most important amendment [fifth]
is superfluous. The natural and obvious inference is, that in the
sense of the Constitution, "due process of law" was not meant
or intended to include, ex vi terinini, the institution and procedure of a grand jury in any case. 8 0

Despite the words "ex vi termini," it is apparent from the context of the statement, that the purpose of making the statement
75
76
77
78
79
80

Id. at 321.
212 U.S. 78, 84 (1909).
Id. at 84.
110 U.S. 516 (1884).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
110 U.S. at 534.
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was n6t merely to show that the due process clause of both
amendments need not necessarily include the institution of grand
jury; its purpose was to demonstrate that the due process clause
cannot possibly include that institution. The argument from
superfluity here hardly establishes its object.
If the Court meant that the due process clause of the fifth
amendment cannot include the institution of grand jury because
such inclusion would render the specific provision superfluous,
the argument denies recognition to an old and useful legislative
device for eliminating the casus omissus. Coke, to whose works
there is considerable reference in Hurtado v. California, himself
says in discussing the Magna Carta: "[T]hese words, per legem
terrae, being towards the end of this chapter, doe referre to all
the precedent matter in this chapter.181 Coke's canon of statutory
interpretation is not new for Celsus tells us, Dig. IX (2). 27. 16,
". non esse novum, ut lex specialiter quibusdam enumeratis
generale subiciat verbum quo specialia complectatur ....
If the Court, in Hurtado v. California, meant that the due
process clause of the fifth amendment cannot include the institution of grand jury because such inclusion would render the
due process clause itself superfluous, the argument is logically
disastrous. If the inclusion of the institution of grand jury in the
due process clause or, for that matter, the inclusion of any other
specific provision of the amendments in that clause would make
that clause superfluous, it follows, does it not, that the exclusion
of such provisions would make that clause vacuous.
While the position of the special provision as to confrontation
in the amendments makes the precise thought suggested in
Hurtado v. California impossible here, I am afraid that something like that thought has caused the Commission on Government Security to regard the statement that dismissal from
government employment is not a criminal prosecution as dispositive of the question raised in this part of my paper. That
statement, while true, disposes only of a short cut from cases
involving criminal prosecution8 3 to our case here. A barring of
the short cut certainly does not relieve us from further efforts
81

Second Institutes 46 (6th ed., Coke, 1681).
"flI]t is nothing new that a statute, after enumerating some special cases
should append a general word including the case already provided for ....
"
KRUEGER, Corpus Iurs Civilis IX (2) 27.16 (1954).
83 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53 (1957); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953). See, today, 18
82

18 U.S.C.A. § 2500 (Supp. 1956).
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to reach an answer. Fortunately, in making the effort, we are not
obligated to grope in the dark.
There were four dissenting opinions in Jay v. Boyd,8 4 delivered
by Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black, Frankfurter and
Douglas. Not all the dissenting Justices agreed as to why they
disagreed with the majority opinion; but it is plain from what
they said that they agreed on one point-that a fair hearing in
the American sense means a hearing where one has the opportunity to meet the accusers. Justices Frankfurter and Douglas
both referred to a statement made by President Eisenhower in
1953:
In this country, if someone dislikes you, or accuses you, he must
come up in front. He cannot hide behind the shadow. He can-

not assassinate you or your character from behind, without
suffering the penalties an outraged citizenry will impose.8 5

And Justice Douglas observed:
That bit of Americana is relevant here because we have a

question as to what a 'hearing' is in the American meaning of

the word. Fairness, implicit in our notions of due process, requires that any 'hearing' be full and open with an opportunity
to know the charge and the accusers, to reply to the charge,
and to meet the accusers. 8 6

Bailey v. Richardson8 7 has been alluded to earlier. In that
case the court squarely denied the right to confrontation. The
circumstances of the case are peculiar and serve to show how
completely the court misapprehended the nature of the questions
before it. Prior to June 28, 1947, Miss Bailey was employed in
the classified civil service. On June 28, 1947, she was separated
from the service due to a reduction in force. On May 28, 1948,
she was reinstated to her former position under a regulation
which made such reinstatement subject to the condition that
removal could be ordered by the Commission, after investigation,
for certain disqualifications, among them, if ". . . on all the
evidence, reasonable grounds exist for the belief that the person
is disloyal to the Government of the United States."
Miss Bailey was given a hearing, both before the Commission
and before the Loyalty Review Board; but she was denied confrontation by the witnesses against her. After these hearings, she
was removed under the above-quoted paragraph of the regulations.
351 U.S. 345 (1956).
85 Address by President Eisenhower, Washington, D.C., Nov. 23, 1953.
86 351 U.S. at 375.
87 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
84
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The court seems to have misunderstood the question before
it as follows: (1) It thought it significant to determine whether,
at the time of her final removal, Miss Bailey was in the classified
civil service, thus making her case fall under the provisions of
the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, or whether she was a "probationary
employee" and thus outside the puriew of the act. The court
held that she was a "probationary employee." The purpose of
this determination was not to avoid the effect of those early
cases, including Shurtleff v. United States,88 which hold that an
employee dismissable for cause must be given a hearing, but
merely to show that Miss Bailey had no rights in her employment. And the court said that, in any case, by being afforded a
hearing without confrontation she was given a better treatment
than she was entitled to under the Lloyd-LaFollette Act itself.
(2) Having thus focused its attention on Miss Bailey's employment rights, the court went on to hold that she had no right to
confrontation; (a) because her dismissal was not a criminal
prosecution, and (b) because her claim to continued employment being a mere privilege, she was not being deprived of
"property" and clearly she was not being deprived of "liberty"
or of "life."89
I have endeavored to point out in the first part of this article
that the issue involved in this problem is not the right to continue
in the Government's employ; rather it is whether the individual
has any valid claim to due process when the Government undertakes to publicly record a serious charge against him which
destroys his means of living, his credit and estimation, just as
surely as if he were convicted of a crime. If it is necessary that
the claimant show the invasion of some property right before due
process be asserted, it would seem that the right to good standing in the community with its concomitant economic advantages
is such a right. The court should not, it seems to me, exhibit the
over-fastidiousness of a property law teacher when it is interpreting a provision which has for its essence the "protection of
the individual against arbitrary action." 90 It is this preoccupation
with the property right involved, and the unwarranted restriction
of the inquiry to the nature of the employment right lost, which
has led many to distinguish the decisions in Parker v. Lester9
88
89
90

189 U.S. 311 (1903).
182 F.2d at 57.
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n., 310 U.S. 292, 302
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227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).

(1937).
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and United States v. Gray92 under the Port Security Program,
as being confined to loss of rights in private employment.
The recent passport cases show a much greater awareness of
the primary issues involved than was shown in Bailey v. Richardson. In Shachtman v. Dulles9 3 the court, in upholding the right
of an individual to attack for insufficiency the reasons given for
denial of a passport, was prepared to recognize plaintiff's claim
to due process in the Secretary's refusal to issue a passport. In
reaching its decision the court stated, "The right to travel, to go
from place to place as the means of transportation permit, is a
natural right subject to the rights of others and to reasonable
regulation under law."19 4 While this seems to be an extra-broad
statement of the type of right protected by the fifth amendment
due process clause, it does show that courts ought to be slow to
find the absence of life, liberty and property in cases where
arbitrary government action can do irreparable harm to the individual. 95 Subsequent cases have upheld the individual's right
to have a complete statement of such reasons, or a statement why
they should not be revealed. Boudin v. Dulles;96 Dayton v.
Dulles.9 7 However, in Dayton v. Dulles,98 the right to have disclosed confidential information relied on for denial of passport
was not recognized. The court accepted the Secretary's reason
that "the disclosure ... might prejudice the conduct of the United
States' foreign relations." 9
It should be noted that the claim that disclosure of information might compromise foreign relations is a special claim not
to be treated on the same plane as the claim that a disclosure
will endanger national security. 10 0 Quite apart from this fact,
Dayton v. Dulles and the passport cases before it reach the basic
question involved in all such claims. The question is not whether
an employee about to be discharged as a security risk has a
property right in his employment, for if he has no property right
207 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1953).
225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
94 225 F.2d at 941.
95 For an interesting discussion on this point, see Seavey, Dismissal of Students:
"Due Process," 70 HAnv. L. Rav. 1406 (1957).
96 235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
97 237 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
98 146 F. Supp. 876 (D.D.C. 1956), afl'd, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 2203 (D.C. Cir.
Oct. 25, 1957).
99 146 F. Supp. at 881.
100 Cf. Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S.
103, 111 (1947).
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in his employment he has a right to his good standing in the
community which ought to be protected under the due process
clause of the fifth amendment against arbitrary destruction by
the Government. The question is not whether confrontation by
witnesses is fair in the context of a charge which very closely
approximates a charge of treason; the question is simply and
solely whether the "balancing of the conflicting individual and
national interests involved"'1 1 justifies a denial of confrontation
"inthe interests of national security."
The question thus presented is not new in history. During
the great debate upon the Liberty of the Subject which preceded
the Petition of Right, one of the principal arguments made on
behalf of the Crown was that its claimed prerogative to imprison
without cause was essential to the safety of the Realm. "How
unfit," argued Serjeant Ashley, "would it be for king or council
to express the particular cause, it is easy to be adjudged, when
there is no state, or policy of government, whether it be monarchical, or of other frame, which have not some secrets of state,
not communicable to vulgar understanding."'1 2 Undoubtedly the
danger from subversive elements today cannot be compared with
that which existed in 1628, but Coke's warning words are as
relevant today as they were then:
[S]uch committments will destroy the endeavor of all
men. Who will endeavour to employ himself in any profession,
either of war, merchandize, or of any liberal knowledge, if he be
but a tenant at will of his liberty? For no tenant at will will
support or improve anything, because he hath no certain estate
103

Coke's message has special significance for us today. 10 4
The abolition of the King's Court of Star Chamber by the
Long Parliament in 1640 is for us symbolic of the death of
arbitrary government. Henry Case, whose work, English Liberties
or the Free-BornSubject's Inheritance,was much read by Americans, 10 5 tells us that "they [the Court of Star Chamber] pretended
to a power to examine men upon their oaths, touching crimes
by them supposed to be committed, which is contrary to all law
101
102
103

American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 410 (1950).
3 How. ST. TR. 150 (1628).
3 How. ST. TR. 131 (1628).

104 GELLHORN, SECURITY, LOYALTY, AND SCIENCE (1950). For other authorities
see Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae, pp. 26-29; Peters

v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
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SUBJEcr's INHERITANCE 106

(1703). See also Hazeltine, The Influence of the Magna Carta on American Constitutional Development, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1917).
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and reason; for ... no man is bound to accuse himself." The
idea that no man is bound to accuse himself is different from
the later concept of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Udall's trial in 1590106 shows that he claimed the right to be
accused by others but said nothing of the right, once so accused,
to refuse to answer questions put to him. Wigmore missed the
point by looking for the privilege in its present form. It led him
to dismiss Coke's first mention of the privilege in 1589 in Cullier
and Cullier'07 as a mere invention so far as the common law was
concerned. 10 8 If he had looked for the privilege in the form in
which it was claimed by Udall, at the early stages of prosecution,
he would have found good evidence that the privilege was known
at common law. Lambard speaking in 1579, ten years before
Coke inCulier and Cullier, of the statute 2 & 3 P. & M., c.10
(1554), which required justices of the peace to take the examination of a prisoner before commitment, stated:
There also you may see (if I bee not deceived) the time when

the examination of the felon himselfe, was first warranted by
our lawe. For at common lawe, his faulte. was not to bee wrung
out of himselfe but rather to be proved by others. 10 9

The significance of these observations is that from the earliest
days of the common law, Englishmen claimed the right to be
accused by others before they be put to answer, and this claim
involved the claim to have the accusers brought face to face at
trial. The statutes 25 HEN. 8, c. 14 1533); 5 & 6 EDw. 6 c. 11
§ 12 (2) (1552); and 1 & 2,P.&M.,c. 10 § 11 (1554), testify
to this fact. Lilbum, whose treatment by the Star Chamber drew
the wrath of the Long Parliament, claimed not only the right to
be accused by others but the right to have the accusers produced. 1 0
Wigmore notes that in treason trials the right to have the
accusers produced, claimed under 1 EDW. 6, c. 12 § 22 (1522)
and 1 & 2 P. & M. c. 10 § 11 (1554), was generally denied by
a nice argument based on 1 & 2 P. & M. c. 10 § 7 (1554). He
concludes that there was no such right in the early common
law."1 But he fails to note that the trials he refers to are all
106 1 How. ST. TR. 1271 (1590).
107

Cro. Eliz. 201, 78 Eng. Rep. 457 (Q.B. 1589).
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8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 nn.90-91 (3d ed. 1940).

I LAMBARD, EIRENARCHA OR OF THE OFFICE OF THE JUSTICE OF PEACE 208-09
(1st ed. 1581). Lambard was no mean historian. See 4 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
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ENGLISH LAW 117-19 (3d ed. 1945).

110 Trial of Lilburn and Wharton, for Printing and Publishing Seditious Books,
3 How. ST.TR. 1315, 1322 (1637).
111 .5 WIMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364 nn.40-42 (3d ed. 1940).
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before special commissions of Oyer and Terminer, which commissions should not be confused with the regular common law
courts. It should be remembered, too, that in matters of State
the King's judges were not too eager to incur the King's displeasure.11 2
It is a grave error to think that Englishmen in the years which
gave content to the fifth amendment due process clause of our
Constitution were unaware of the right to confrontation as a
major guarantee against oppression. William Hudson, who must
have written his Treatise of the Court of Star Chamber before it
became clothed in contumely, tells us:
Now concerning the persons of witnesses examined in court,
it is a great imputation to our English courts, that witnesses are
privately produced, and how base or simple soever they be,
although they be tested diabolares, yet they make as good a
sound, being read out of paper, as the best; yea although a lewd
and beggarly fellow take upon him the name and person of an
honest man, and be privately examined, this may be easily overpassed, not easily found out . . . [he then tells us that some
attempt was made to change this practice in the Star Chamber
by Lord Chancellor Egerton] .... But it is as much wondered,
that this court [Star Chamber] suffereth not the parties to
examine the credit of witnesses, to notify the court what their
And the reason why it is not given way unto
condition is ....
in this court is, for that causes being for the King, if witnesses
lives should be so ripped up, no man would willingly be produced to testify; and therefore many opinions and circuits of
judges are extant in this court, where it is adjudged that a
witness deposing for the King upon an indictment shall not be
questioned for perjury; yea this court hath ordered a great reward to witnesses in this court by yielding their testimonies
for the King .... 113

The Court of Star Chamber, as Hudson wrote of it, was still
the champion of the outcast, the disdained and the powerless.
There seemed good reason why the names of witnesses should
be withheld from the powerful defendant; there seemed good
reason why those witnesses who were produced should not have
their lives "ripped up."
The Inquisition too had a good reason for withholding from
the accused all knowledge of the witnesses against him-the
risk which witnesses would run in testifying in the midst of a
112 See the pitiful excuses given before Parliament by the King's judges as to
why they denied habeas corpus to the members who had been imprisoned by Charles
I. Proceedings in Parliament Relating to the Liberty of the Subject, 3 How. ST. TR.
59, 159-64 (1628).
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generally hostile population. We are told that, ".... the tender
care for the safety of witnesses even went so far that it was left
to the conscience of the inquisitor whether or not to give the
accused a copy of the evidence itself if there appeared to be
danger to be apprehended from doing so." 114 It is a somber
fact that what appeared to be such good reasons for denial of
confrontation, turned the Star Chamber and the Inquisition into
instruments of crushing oppression." 5
Too much depends upon security today to reject its demands
at.the first rattle of a few historical skeletons. But these instances
of the argument from necessity should give us pause to see
whether we have not left some stones unturned. Briefly, the
arguments for denying confrontation in government employee
security cases are: first, as to the undercover agent regularly
employed by an investigative branch of the Government, his
usefulness thereafter would be destroyed; second, as to the casual
informant, his information would often not be forthcoming
unless he could be assured that his identity would not be disclosed-a faith which must be kept to encourage others like
him; third, the disclosure of one source of information is like
giving the subversive element in our country a piece in a jigsaw
puzzle, inasmuch as it might be matched with other such pieces
to reveal the entire system employed in protecting our country
from subversion.
The third argument does not seem to me to have any force
independently of the first two. I do not think that it requires
demonstration that the first two arguments are sound so far as
they go. But they do not support the conclusion that confrontation by witnesses in all cases would endanger national security.
They support only the conclusion that confrontation by undercover agents and casual informants who have a dread of publicity
would endanger national security. What is necessary to support
the conclusion that confrontation by witnesses in all cases would
endanger national security is a showing that in some cases, at
least, it would be impossible to obtain enough testimony from
persons other than undercover agents and casual informants
who request anonimity to satisfy even the very small quantum
of proof required for a security discharge. Curiously enough, no
such showing has been made; and, so far as I can see, the Commission on Government Security has called for none.
1 LEA, THE INQUISITION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 440 (1888).
115 LEA, op. cit. supra 437-51. His work, while not unbiased, is regarded as a
leading authority on the subject.
114
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I have used the word impossible. I have no doubt that there
are a number of cases where an employee should be removed,
but where it might be difficult to obtain the testimony of anyone
other than an undercover agent or casual informant who requests anonimity. This same problem has caused many an exasperated police officer to practice the third degree. Yet those
detached from this police officer's everyday cares have been
able to see that such methods impair police efficiency. 16
What, however, if there are some cases where it is impossible
to obtain the testimony of anyone other than an undercover
agent or a casual informant who requests anonimity? I have
no doubt that there must be a number of such cases. Most likely
these would be cases where the activity or association throwing
doubt upon the employee's loyalty occurred in the past so that
the number of presently available witnesses could not be increased by presently recruiting persons to witness the subversive
activities. But here the available witnesses must mainly be in the
casual informant category. A regularly employed agent surely
does not wait to put the information in the employee's file until
the employee has discontinued his activities or associations. The
only undercover agents that I can think of in this situation are
ones that have become such upon defection from the subversive
cause. It might be worth considering whether, in these cases involving past activities or associations and, very likely, inherently
unreliable information, it might not be possible to assure the
protection of national security by some method other than by
discharging a government employee as a security risk without
confrontation.
As to the employee whose present conduct throws doubt upon
his loyalty, I find it difficult to believe that no usable testimony
could be obtained without resort to that of the regularly employed undercover agent or the confidential informant who demands anonimity. It should be noted that, since such employee's
discharge is not a criminal prosecution, the hands of the Government are not tied by the rule expressed in United States v.
Coplon,"' which, in any case, seems to have been an unnecessary
extension of the rule in Nardone v. United States."8 The Govern116

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON

LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 187-88 (1931). See as to unlawful searches
and seizures, Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 171-74 (1946) (dissent of
Frankfurter, J., to same effect); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905,

914 (1955).
117 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950).
118 308 U.S. 338 (1939). "
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ment would not have to disclose any secret source of the information against an employee in order to benefit from the testimony of a witness who followed a tip given by such source.
Conclusions:
(1) Early English and American cases indicate that when a
governmental body undertakes to remove one of its employees
for a stated cause, denial of a hearing is against "justice and
right," or contrary to "fundamental principles of justice."
(2) The words "justice and right" and "fundamental principles
of justice," when used in early cases, indicate that the courts
were resting their opinion on due process of law.
(3) The early cases referred to admit of a restrictive interpretation of the employee's right to a hearing in that they recognize such right solely in cases where there is a dismissal for a
stated cause pursuant to a statutory power to dismiss for cause
only.
(4) If, in the exercise of a power to dismiss for cause only, it
is contrary to "justice and right" to dismiss without a hearing
under a stated cause, it must likewise be against "justice and
right" to dismiss, without a hearing, under a stated cause, in the
exercise of a power to dismiss at will. Therefore, the restrictive
interpretation of the early cases ought to be rejected.
(5) In the context of Government security proceedings, the
restrictive interpretation of the early cases supports the denial
of a right to a hearing only in cases where the Government has
stated a cause for removal when, under the applicable statute,
it was free to dismiss at will.
(6) Most of the security cases, however, involve employees
who can be removed only for certain stated causes. Even on the
restrictive interpretation of the early eases referred to, a denial
of a hearing in such security cases would be contrary to due
process. A provision of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act purports to
make hearings discretionary with the removing officer both in
cases where the removal can proceed without stated cause and
in cases where a cause must be stated for the removal. This
provision is unconstitutional.
(7) At least in those Government security cases where, under
the applicable statute, the employee can be removed only for
certain stated causes, denial of confrontation cannot proceed
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on the basis that the Government was not required to give the
employee a hearing at all. And, if the restrictive interpretation of
the early cases is rejected, neither is this basis for a denial of
confrontation available in cases where, under the applicable
statute, the employee can be removed at will but where the
Government undertakes to state a cause for his removal.
(8) Where due process of law demands that a hearing be
given, the American sense of the word "hearing" requires that
it be full and open with an opportunity to know the charge and
the accusers, to reply to the charge, and to meet the accusers.
The burden is upon those who would deny it this meaning to
establish their case.
(9) This burden is not discharged by pointing to the fact that
a Government security proceeding is not a criminal prosecution.
The Constitution speaks to the question of confrontation not
only through Amendment VI but also through Amendment V;
and a contrary conclusion based on the argument from superfluity is indefensible on ancient and proper canons of stautory
interpretation.
(10) Where the Government undertakes to remove one of its
employees for the stated cause that his continued employment
is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security,
the sole justification for denying him an unqualified right to
confrontation is that the granting of such a right would endanger national security to the point where the balancing of the
individual and national interests involved requires a rejection of
the individual interests.
I do not reach a conclusion on the question whether
the recognition of an unqualified right to confrontation would
endanger national security to this pbint because I do not think
that, on an issue so vital to our defense, one can speak rashly.
But I hope that when the answer to that question is finally undertaken, the assumptions that a government employee has no constitutional claim to a hearing and that the Constitution speaks to
confrontation only through Amendment VI, will not be allowed
to weigh in the balance against the individual.

